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A dishonest person often utilizes another person’s obliviousness to appropriate the property that belongs
to the other person. Previous researchers have studied the making of a dishonest choice and the ma-
nipulation of truthful information. Here, we have investigated the neural correlates of processing the
outcomes of dishonest decisions. Participants in this study were asked to interact with counterparts in an
economic game. They could accept the counterparts’ proposals on how to divide the proﬁts (honest
choice) or choose the alternative plan that was advantageous to themselves (dishonest choice), playing to
the ignorance of their counterparts who had a 50% chance of detecting the situation. Successful dishonest
choices (not being detected) would bring large rewards, whereas honest choices would lead to less of a
reward, and failed dishonest choices (being caught) would result in no reward. Participants’ neural re-
sponses during the outcome presentations were recorded by functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) and event-related potential (ERP) methods in different sessions. We found that the outcomes of
successful dishonest (vs. honest) choices elicited stronger activations in the ventral striatum and pos-
terior cingulate cortex and a smaller ERP component called feedback-related negativity (FRN), which
suggests that positive outcome evaluation and attention processing were aroused by successful dishonest
choices. Moreover, the outcomes of failed dishonest (relative to honest) choices were associated with
different neural response patterns in the medial orbitofrontal cortex and P3b ERP component between
human and computer counterparts, suggesting that processing the output of social decision making
(playing human) is different from that of risk taking (playing computer). The ﬁndings advanced our
understanding about the neural processing of outcome presentation after a dishonest choice has been
made.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Dishonesty is a common social phenomenon. A dishonest
person appropriates the property of another person by deliber-
ately utilizing his or her ignorance. The dishonest individual may
either fabricate non-factual information or take advantage of13
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ang),another person’s lack of knowledge without manipulating the
truth. For instance, a salesman either exaggerates the efﬁciency of
the product or conceals the defects of it to his or her customers in
a trade show. Similarly, a government ofﬁcer may embezzle public
funds and run away when supervision is lacking. Given its fre-
quency across different social contexts, dishonesty and its inner
mechanisms have aroused intense interest in both public and
academic researchers.
The neural correlates of dishonest behaviors have been in-
vestigated for more than a decade (for a recent review, see Abe,
2011). The majority of such studies cite the manipulation of
truthful information, in another words, deception (see Vrij, 2004)
as their focus (Abe et al., 2008; Langleben et al., 2002; Lee et al.,
2002; Spence et al., 2001; Sun et al., 2013). Recently, researchers
have begun to investigate the neural circuits that underpin a dis-
honest decision (Abe et al., 2014; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Greenender the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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our knowledge, few researches have investigated neural proces-
sing after a dishonest action. Compared with honesty in real life, a
successful dishonest action (not being caught) often brings large
rewards while failed dishonest responses (being caught and pun-
ished) bring large losses. In line with this thought, the neural
correlates of outcome processing may reﬂect whether a dishonest
action has been made, even after the actual action. Our current
ﬁndings could provide important insights to future investigations
on using neural patterns to identify honest/dishonest behaviors.
In this study, we aimed to delineate neural signals during the
outcome presentation after a dishonest choice had been made.
Participants in this study were asked to interact with counterparts
in an economic game. They could behave honestly by accepting
the counterpart's offer on how to divide a reward, or they could
make a dishonest choice that was advantageous to them but
harmed their counterparts. The probability of the situation (both
honesty and dishonesty) being detected was 50%. A successful
dishonest choice (not being detected) would lead to a large re-
ward, the honest choice would bring less of a reward, and a failed
dishonest action (being caught) would result in no reward. This
task paradigm mimics dishonest behaviors in real life, such as
occupying another person’s property, taking advantage of the
victim’s ignorance. Furthermore, it models the risk of being caught
and punished for dishonesty. Our previous behavioral studies
showed that this task could robustly evoke dishonest decisions
(Zhang et al., 2012). Here, we were particularly interested in the
neural processing for the outcome of dishonest choices, which
could consist of two processes, including the processing of rewards
associated with the decision” (i.e., whether the monetary goal of
the dishonest choice is achieved) and “success of the action itself”
(i.e., whether the dishonest action is detected), and we did not aim
to differentiate them in this study. Therefore, a “successful dis-
honest action” denoted that a dishonest choice was not caught,
which led to large reward. In contrast, a “failed dishonest action”
meant that a dishonest choice was detected, which resulted in no
reward. We did not ask participants to manipulate truth in this
task because we were interested in the neural mechanism of
processing the outcome of a dishonest decision and hence did not
want it to be confused by that of fabricating information. Future
studies on telling lies with bad intentions could employ more
complex task paradigms based on our current ﬁndings. In the
present study, methods of high spatial resolution (fMRI) and of
high temporal resolution (ERP) were employed (in different ses-
sions) to record participants' neural responses during outcome
presentation.
Previous fMRI studies have shown that monetary rewards elicit
stronger blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) activations than do
no rewards or negative consequences in the ventral striatum (vStr)
(Breiter et al., 2001; Coricelli et al., 2005; Xue et al., 2011), medial
orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) (Knutson et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2007;
Ursu and Carter, 2005), and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) (Fu-
jiwara et al., 2009; Izuma et al., 2008; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005c).
A recent meta-analysis by Liu et al. (2011) investigated 142 neu-
roimaging studies and showed that vStr, mOFC, and PCC all re-
spond more strongly to positive than negative outcomes. The vStr
and mOFC are two major projection sites of the midbrain dopa-
mine system, which is widely hypothesized to serve as a common-
reward metric for evaluating rewards delivered in different mod-
alities (for a recent review, see Haber and Knutson, 2010). On the
other hand, the PCC activity was shown to increase during atten-
tional biasing to targets with high motivational value, i.e., food vs.
tools (Mohanty et al., 2008). In an electrophysiological study on
monkeys while they shifted their gaze to visual targets for liquid
rewards, McCoy et al. (2003) found that the PCC neurons re-
sponded following saccades, as well as following reward delivery,and these responses were related to the magnitude of the reward.
These ﬁndings suggest that the brain responses in PCC encode the
neural processing of attention to stimulus with reward. In line
with these previous ﬁndings, considering that successful/failed
dishonest action (relative to honest action) in this study means
larger/smaller material reward, the stronger/weaker brain activa-
tions in vStr, mOFC, and PCC may be utilized to reﬂect more po-
sitive/negative outcome evaluation and enhanced/reduced atten-
tion allocation elicited by successful/failed dishonest action than
by an honest choice. We thus hypothesized to ﬁnd stronger BOLD
activations in vStr, mOFC, and PCC for dishonest (relative to hon-
est) choices when undetected than detected.
The neuroimaging method locates the regions of interest with
high spatial resolution (a few millimeters) in the brain, whereas
the neurophysiological technique provides neural information
with high temporal resolution (about a millisecond). Previous
studies using event-related potential (ERP) found that the pre-
sentation of monetary loss (relative to gain) was followed by ne-
gative-going amplitudes at medial frontal scalp sites about 250 ms
post-feedback. The waveform is termed feedback related nega-
tivity (FRN) and is supposed to be associated with quick neural
responses to the valence of outcome at the early stage of in-
formation processing (Gehring andWilloughby, 2002; Hewig et al.,
2007; Osinsky et al., 2013). A previous study by Holroyd et al.
(2004) showed that the FRN to an outcome depended on the re-
lative value of the outcome in possible outcomes. They found that
the worst and medium outcomes were related to larger FRN than
the best outcomes, regardless of whether the possible outcomes
were all no-positive outputs (i.e., losing 0, 2.5, or 5 cents), no-
negative outputs (i.e., gaining 0, 2.5, or 5 cents) or outputs with
both positive and negative values (i.e., getting 0 cents, winning 10
cents, or losing 10 cents). Therefore, the FRN may be used to re-
present the relative value of the outcome among possible out-
comes. We therefore hypothesized that smaller FRN would be
found when dishonest (relative to honest) choices were not de-
tected compared to that of being detected.
Another ERP component, P3, was also found to reﬂect the in-
formation of outcome processing. The P3 is a positive potential
with peak latency after 300 ms post stimulus presentation and
was found to be sensitive to the motivational signiﬁcance of the
eliciting stimulus (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005a). It consists of two
sub-components, i.e., P3a and P3b. The P3a peaks 60–80 ms earlier
than the P3b. Further, the P3a exhibits a frontocentral distribution
while the P3b is prominent at parietocentral sites. The P3a is
scarcely found to be associated with outcome processing. In con-
trast, Yeung and Sanfey (2004) found that the P3b is sensitive to
the magnitude of outcome regardless of whether it concerns a
gain or a loss of money. In line with this ﬁnding, the outcome of
large (successful dishonest action), less (honest choice), and no
reward (failed dishonest behavior) should be represented by large,
medium, and small P3b amplitudes, respectively. We thus also
hypothesized that larger P3b would be found when dishonest
choices (relative to honest) were not detected compared to the
case where they are detected.2. Material and methods
2.1. Participants
Twenty–ﬁve female undergraduate/postgraduate Chinese stu-
dents (20–25 years old) in the East China Normal University,
China, were recruited for both fMRI and ERP sessions. Only females
were recruited for this study in order to control for the sex-related
effect on decision making (Lee et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2012).
They were all right-handed (Oldﬁeld, 1971), and they had no metal
Fig. 1. Task paradigm. In this example, the counterpart is a human being (re-
presented by an icon of a human face). The cyan and purple areas in the vertical
stacked bars represented the proportions of reward assigned to the counterpart
and the participant, respectively. The total amount to be divided and the proposal
bar by the counterpart were shown on the left-hand side. The participant could
choose between the two bars in the middle of the screen. One bar was consistent
with the proposal by the counterpart (i.e., Hon bar); the other bar (i.e., Dis bar)
indicated a plan advantageous to the participant herself. The result was re-
presented by the outcome bar on the right-hand side. Each trial was preceded by an
interval randomly varying between 2 s and 6 s and consisted of two 4-s phases.
During the ﬁrst phase, the participant had to make a choice by pressing one of the
two buttons with the right index or middle ﬁnger. Once the response was made, a
black line appeared under the chosen bar. During the second phase, a black line
appeared above the outcome bar if the real situation was detected. On the contrary,
no line was shown if the detection did not occur. When a Dis action was detected,
the participant gained nothing in this trial and her area in the outcome bar became
black. Under the other conditions, the participant kept the amount (as well as the
area) for herself. If there was no response or the response exceeded the ﬁrst 4-s
phase, all of the reward would be sent to the counterpart. Dis—dishonest, Hon—
honest, Y—being detected, and N—not being detected.
D. Sun et al. / Neuropsychologia 68 (2015) 148–157150or medical device implants or histories of neurological or cardio-
vascular disorders. Participants all gave informed consent for a
protocol approved by the local ethics committee. Among these 25
participants, ﬁve of them were excluded from fMRI analysis be-
cause of data recording errors. Seven participants were excluded
from ERP analysis because of large noises and/or small (o12) trial
numbers under some task condition. Fifteen participants were
included in both fMRI and ERP analyses.
2.2. Experimental task
The participant in this task was instructed to play as a trustee
who received a monetary investment from a counterpart (in-
vestor), repaid a proportion of the increased investment in each
trial, and held the rest (Fig. 1). The participant also received a
proposal from the counterpart on how to divide the reward. She
could choose to repay as much as (honest, Hon) or less than
(dishonest, Dis) the proportions proposed. The participant was
instructed beforehand that, after the choice was made, the possi-
bility of the real situation being detected (Y) vs. not being detected
(N) was 50%. The participant won nothing in the trial if a Dis
choice was caught but gained the amount kept for herself in the
other conditions. The participant was asked to treat each trial as a
single-shot interaction since no players (investors and trustees)
could recognize whether the counterparts had met in previous
trials. The participant was told that half of the counterparts were
human beings (Hm), while the others were computer programs
(PC). Either a photo of human face representing a humancounterpart (there were a total of 2 males and 2 females, of front
view with neutral expression, randomly shown) or a laptop de-
noting a computer counterpart was presented during each trial.
The participant was told that the photo was only used to show the
type of counterpart (Hm or PC) but not other information. She did
not know that, in fact, computer programs mimicked all of the
responses of her counterparts. The participant was asked to make
her own decision in the task and would ultimately receive a real
monetary bonus proportional to the amount earned during the
experimental session. Because of the ethical regulations, each
participant was only given 250 Chinese Yuan as compensation. She
was told that the bonus gained in the task was included in this
amount.
In each trial, the amount of the increased investment was
shown on the screen for 4 s during which the participant had to
make her choice by pressing one of two buttons. One of the but-
tons signiﬁed the Dis choice and the other signiﬁed the Hon choice
(the order of buttons was counterbalanced across trials). In the
following 4 s, the participant was informed of whether the real
situation was detected and how much she gained in this trial. The
proportions of reward assigned to the counterpart and the parti-
cipant were represented by the cyan and purple areas in the ver-
tical stacked bars, respectively. The total amount to be divided and
the proposal bar by the counterpart were shown on the left-hand
side. The participant could choose between the two bars in the
middle of the screen. One of them was consistent with the pro-
posal by the counterpart (i.e. Hon bar); the other bar (i.e. Dis bar)
indicated a plan advantageous to the participant herself. The result
was represented by the outcome bar on the right-hand side. Each
trial was preceded by an inter-trial interval (ITI) randomly varying
between 2 s and 6 s and consisted of two 4-s phases. During the
ﬁrst phase, the participant had to make a choice by pressing one of
the two buttons with the right index or middle ﬁnger (the order of
buttons was counterbalanced across trials). Once the response was
made, a black line appeared under the chosen bar. During the
second phase, a black line appeared above the outcome bar if the
real situation was detected. On the contrary, no line was shown if
the detection did not occur. When a Dis action was detected, the
participant gained nothing in this trial and her area in the outcome
bar became black. Under the other conditions, the participant kept
the amount (as well as the area) for herself. If there was no re-
sponse, or should the response exceed the ﬁrst 4-s phase, all re-
ward would be sent to the counterpart. The subjective utilities
(rewardpossibility) were the same for the two choices. The
permutation of the total amount, i.e. the amount to be divided (a
number randomly generated between 80 and 150), the proposed
portion of repayment to the counterpart (60%, 65%, 70%), and the
location (left or right) of the Dis/Hon bars were randomized for
each participant.2.3. Procedure
Participants were required to participate in an fMRI session and
an ERP session in two separate time slots within two weeks. The
order of the two sessions was counterbalanced across participants.
Prior to data collection, participants practiced about 10 trials using
a set of symbols different from those used during data collection.
In the formal task, there were 5 runs of 24 trials in the fMRI ses-
sion and 12 runs of 24 trials in the ERP session. More trials were
included in the ERP session to compensate for the relatively low
SNR in ERP data recording. Participants were debriefed after
completing the two sessions and were paid.
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2.4.1. fMRI data
Scans were conducted on a 3-Tesla Siemens Trio MR scanner.
Thirty-ﬁve axial slices covering the whole brain were obtained
using a T2*-weighted echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence
(TR¼2000 ms, TE¼30 ms, ﬂip angle¼90°, matrix¼6464, Field
of View (FOV)¼240240 mm2, slice thickness¼4 mm without
gap) for functional images. The axial slices were adjusted to be
parallel to the AC-PC plane. A high-resolution structural image for
each participant was also acquired using 3D MRI sequences
(TR¼1900 ms, TE¼3.43 ms, ﬂip angle¼7°, matrix¼256256,
FOV¼210210 mm2, slice thickness¼1 mm). The visual stimuli
presentations and response collections were performed through
the integrated functional imaging system (IFIS).
2.4.2. ERP data
Scalp electrical potentials were recorded through an elastic
electroencephalogram (EEG) cap (Brain Products Company, Ger-
many) embedded with 64 tin scalp electrodes according to the
extended international 10–20 system. All channel impedances
were kept below 10 kΩ. The EEG signals were ampliﬁed using a
0.05–100 Hz band-pass ﬁlter and continuously sampled at 500 Hz.
Vertical and horizontal eye movements were recorded by two
electrodes at the temporal and lower sides of the left eye, re-
spectively. The visual stimuli presentations and response collec-
tions were performed through E-Prime software (Psychology
Software Tools, Inc.).
2.5. Statistical analysis
2.5.1. Behavioral data
The trials without responses were less than 5% of the total trials
and were thus excluded from analyses. The behavioral performance
consisted of the frequency of Dis choice and the respective reaction
time before the actualization of Dis and Hon choices. The frequency
of Dis choice was calculated through dividing the number of trials of
Dis choice by the number of total trials having responses (i.e.,
DisþHon). Both the frequency of choice and the reaction time were
calculated for Hm and PC counterparts, respectively. The behavioral
performances in both sessions were collected from all participants,
although some of themwere excluded in later fMRI or ERP analyses.
To test whether participants’ responses were consistent between
the two sessions, we conducted the Pearson correlation analyses on
the behavioral performances between sessions using SPSS version
20.0 software (IBM Corp.).
2.5.2. fMRI data
Neuroimaging data were analyzed using the SPM8 software
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, UK). The func-
tional scans of each participant were spatially realigned to adjust
for head movement and corrected for slice-acquisition timing.
Anatomical images were then co-registered to the mean functional
image and were segmented into gray/white matter according to an
anatomical template of Eastern Asian brains. After that, the func-
tional images were normalized to the Montreal Neurological In-
stitute (MNI) brain template and smoothed with an 8-mm full-
width half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian ﬁlter.
In this study, we were only interested in the processing of
outcome. The ﬁndings (both fMRI and ERP) during decision mak-
ing (the ﬁrst 4 s phase involving pressing the button) are reported
elsewhere. The general line model (GLM) was used to examine the
experimental effects across task events. Eight regressors were
employed to model the onset of outcome presentation. They were
combinations of choice (Dis and Hon), counterpart (Hm and PC),
and detection (Y and N). A regressor modeling the onset of buttonpressing and six extra regressors modeling residual head motions
were also included. These regressors were convolved with the SPM
canonical hemodynamic response function. High-pass temporal
ﬁltering with a cut-off of 128 s was recruited to remove low-fre-
quency drifts. Beta-weight images of regressors were employed to
form within-subject contrasts between Dis and Hon choices under
each condition, i.e., Hm&Y, Hm&N, PC&Y, and PC&N.
The contrasting images from all participants were then group-
level analyzed through a two-way ANOVA model with 2 within-
subject factors, i.e., Counterpart and Detection. Results of whole
brain analyzes were voxel-level height thresholded at po0.001
and survived cluster- or peak-level Family Wise Error (FWE) cor-
rection (po0.025). The xjView toolbox (http://www.alivelearn.
net/xjview) was used for the anatomical deﬁnition. The MarsBaR
toolbox (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/) was used to extract from
each participant the % signal change of each event (there were
totally 8 events, i.e. 2 [Choice: Dis vs. Hon] by 2 [counterpart: Hm
vs. PC] by 2 [Detection: Y vs. N] combinations). We then calculated
the % signal change of Dis–Hon in 4 conditions (i.e. Hm&Y, Hm&N,
PC&Y, and PC&N). For example, the % signal change of the event
Hm&Dis&N was contrasted with that of the event Hm&Hon&N to
form the % signal change of Dis–Hon in the condition of Hm&N.
2.5.3. ERP data
The scalp electrical potentials were preprocessed by the SPM8
software. The continuous recordings were ﬁltered (0.1–30 Hz),
corrected for eye-movement (Berg and Scherg, 1994), cut into
epochs (200–2300 ms after outcome onset), and corrected for
baseline signals (200–0 ms). Epochs containing amplitudes ex-
ceeding 7100 mV were removed. Epochs were averaged (robust
averaging) (Wager et al., 2005) in each channel for each partici-
pant. An additional low–pass ﬁlter (o30 Hz) was employed to
remove the high-frequency noises elicited by the robust averaging.
The ERP data were then re-referenced to a computed average of
the whole-scalp EEG channels.
Statistical analysis on the mean amplitudes of ERP data was
conducted using SPSS software. Consistent with the published
guidelines for studies using electroencephalography (Keil et al.,
2014), the representative channels and time windows of the three
ERP components of interest that we selected were based on pre-
vious research cited in Introduction section, and on visual in-
spection of our own data: (I) FRN, channel Fz, 250–280 ms; (II)
P3a, channel Fz, 370–420 ms; and (III) P3b, channel Pz, 450–
490 ms. Mean amplitudes of the contrast Dis–Hon under each
condition were extracted from the representative channel within
the time window for each component and entered into a two-way
ANOVA model with 2 within-subject factors, i.e., Counterpart and
Detection.3. Results
3.1. Behavioral ﬁndings
Results showed that, regardless of the type of the counterpart,
the frequencies of Dis choice across the sessions were positively
correlated, and the reaction times of the difference between Dis
and Hon choices between sessions were positively correlated (for
correlation coefﬁcients and statistical signiﬁcance, please see
Fig. 2). These results suggested that participants behaved con-
sistently in the fMRI session and the ERP session.
3.2. fMRI ﬁndings
An average effect of condition comparing the Dis and Hon
choices across conditions showed that Dis (vs. Hon) choices
Fig. 2. Behavioral performance is highly correlated between the fMRI and the ERP session. The Pearson correlation coefﬁcient and statistical signiﬁcance were shown. Dis—
dishonest and Hon—honest.
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frontal gyrus/insula, medial frontal gyrus (including anterior cin-
gulate gyrus and thalamus) and middle cingulate gyrus and the
right middle frontal gyrus, whereas weaker activations (negative
effect) in right supramarginal gyrus and superior temporal gyrus.
The main effect of Detection (Table 1 and Fig. 3) showed that
dishonesty, relative to honest choices (i.e., the contrast Dis–Hon),
elicited stronger BOLD activations in bilateral vStr, mOFC, and PCC
when not being detected (N) than being detected (Y). Whole brain
analysis did not show signiﬁcant results for the main effect of
Counterpart or the interaction between Counterpart and Detec-
tion. However, the non-signiﬁcance may be attributed to the too
strict statistical threshold (i.e. FWE correction within the whole
brain). Therefore, to investigate whether the brain activations
during Dis choice are different from those for the Hon choice
under different conditions, we extracted the % signal changes of
the contrast of Dis–Hon from the above signiﬁcant clusters
(spheres with radius¼8 mm, the centers located at the MNI co-
ordinates of peak signiﬁcance listed in Table 1) for each of the four
conditions (Hm&Y, Hm&N, PC&Y, and PC&N) and compared them
with 0 (using one sample t test). Results (Table 3 and Fig. 3)
showed that the N condition elicited stronger activations in bi-
lateral vStr and PCC, regardless of the counterpart type, whereas
no signiﬁcant results were found for the Y condition in these areas.
On the other hand, the Y condition elicited weaker activations in
mOFC for the Hm but not the PC counterpart whereas there was
no signiﬁcant result for the N condition in mOFC.
3.3. ERP ﬁndings
The signiﬁcant main effect of Detection (Table 2 and Fig. 4)
showed that the contrasting Dis–Hon elicited smaller FRN and P3a
when not being detected (N) than being detected (Y). Thesigniﬁcant main effect of Counterpart showed that the contrast
Dis–Hon elicited smaller FRN and P3a when the counterpart was
Hm rather than PC. A signiﬁcant interaction effect between
Counterpart and Detection was detected in P3b. Post hoc analysis
with Bonferroni correction showed that the contrast Dis–Hon
elicited smaller P3b in condition N than Y only when the coun-
terpart was PC (t(17)¼2.813, p¼0.024) but not Hm (to1).
To investigate whether the ERP responses during the Dis choice
are different from those for the Hon choice under different con-
ditions, we extracted the amplitudes of the contrast Dis–Hon from
the interested ERP components for each of the four conditions
(Hm&Y, Hm&N, PC&Y and PC&N) and compared them with 0
(using one sample t test). Results (Table 3 and Fig. 4) showed that
the N condition was associated with smaller FRN (more positive-
going amplitudes) regardless of the counterpart type whereas
there was no signiﬁcant FRN result for the Y condition. On the
contrary, the Y condition related to larger P3a (more positive-
going amplitudes) regardless of the counterpart type whereas
there was no signiﬁcant P3a result for the N condition. Analysis on
the P3b showed that the Y condition was associated with larger
P3b (more positive-going amplitudes) for PC but not Hm coun-
terpart whereas the N condition was related with larger P3b for
both Hm and PC (a trend of signiﬁcance) counterparts. The average
effect of condition for the contrast Dis-Hon in fMRI data and ERP
waveforms of all conditions in channel Fz and Pz could be seen in
Fig. 5.4. Discussion
A dishonest choice made in real life is often to gain a larger
reward than an honest action. However, the violation of social
norms or laws may cause punishment and brings dishonesty a
Table 1
fMRI results of the 2 (Counterpart, Hm vs. PC) by 2 (Detection, Y vs. N) ANOVA
analysis on the contrast of outcomes between dishonest and honest choices.
Brain Area Cluster MNI coordinates Z
x y z
Average effect of condition
Positive effect
R IFG/INS (BA13/47) 625 39 23 7 6.663
L/R Med FG (BA6/32) 2243 9 35 19 6.245
L IFG/INS (BA13/47) 445 33 23 5 5.335
R Mid FG (BA6) 112 45 1 46 5.062
L/R MCC (BA31) 176 9 28 43 4.637
Negative effect
R Supr (BA39) 128 45 55 31 4.343
R STG (BA22) 137 63 4 22 4.195
Main effect of Counterpart
NS
Main effect of Detection
Y4N
NS
YoN
R vStr 102 15 2 –8 5.280
L vStr 169 12 5 –8 4.999
L/R PCC (BA23) 164 0 22 25 4.603
L/R mOFC (BA10) 240 3 53 1 3.913
Interaction between Counterpart and Detection
NS
Note: Sample size¼20. All results were height thresholded at po0.001 and sur-
vived cluster- or peak-level FWE correction (po0.025). BA—Brodmann’s area;
Cluster—number of voxels within the cluster; Z—Z value; L—Left; R—right; NS—no
signiﬁcance; Hm—human counterpart, PC—computer counterpart, Y—being de-
tected; N—not being detected; MCC—middle cingulate cortex; Med FG—medial
frontal gyrus; Mid FG—middle frontal gyrus; IFG—inferior frontal gyrus; INS—in-
sula; mOFC—medial orbitofrontal cortex; PCC—posterior cingulate cortex; STG—
superior temporal gyrus; Supr—Supramarginal Gyrus; and vStr—ventral striatum.
D. Sun et al. / Neuropsychologia 68 (2015) 148–157 153smaller reward (or even more loss) than honesty. Therefore, dis-
honesty in reality often shows this pattern of outcome: a suc-
cessful dishonest action (not being caught)4an honest decisio-
n4a failed dishonest response (being caught and punished). In
this study, we mimicked this pattern in an economic game and
investigated the neural signals during the resultant presentation
post a dishonest (or an honest) choice. Participants in this study
could increase self-beneﬁts through reducing the repayment to
the counterparts. By utilizing the counterparts’ ignorance (i.e., no
detection), they had chances to gain greater rewards relative to the
outcomes of honest actions. However, they received nothing
(smaller rewards than those of honesty) if the dishonesty was
caught. Both fMRI and ERP methods were employed to record
neural signals in the same group of participants (in different ses-
sions). These ﬁndings suggested that the neural signals could be
used to uncover the dishonest action, even after it has been made.
Importantly, the dishonest action that is behaviorally un-
detectable (i.e., successful dishonest behavior) may still be un-
covered through the neural responses to the outcome of such an
action. The ﬁndings advanced our understanding of neurocogni-
tive functions in dishonesty.
4.1. Neural circuits of processing the outcomes of dishonest choices
As consistent with our ﬁrst a priori hypothesis, stronger BOLD
activations in vStr, mOFC, and PCC were found during dishonest
(relative to honest) choices when not being detected than beingdetected. The vStr and mOFC have been widely accepted as key
brain regions for outcome evaluation (Haber and Knutson, 2010).
Stronger activations in these two brain areas were consistently
found to be related with relatively positive outcomes (Knutson
et al., 2003; Liu et al., 2007; Ursu and Carter, 2005; Xue et al., 2009,
2011). On the other hand, the PCC has been found to play a crucial
role in regulating attention (Hahn et al., 2007; Hampson et al.,
2006), and its increased activations have been detected for those
being rewarded compared to those without (Mohanty et al., 2008).
In line with these previous ﬁndings, the stronger activations in the
three brain areas may reﬂect that, relative to the outcomes of
honest choices (medium reward whether being detected or not),
successful dishonest behavior (large reward) compared to failed
dishonest action (no reward) elicited more positive reward eva-
luation and enhanced attention processing.
Further analyses showed that, relative to the outcome of the
honest choice, the consequence of the dishonest choice elicited
stronger activations in bilateral vStr and PCC only when not de-
tected but not when caught. In other words, a large reward elicited
stronger activations than did the medium-amount reward,
whereas there was no difference detected across a medium-
amount and no reward. A previous study by (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2005b) found that part of the vStr (i.e., caudate) and the PCC ex-
hibited comparable BOLD activations for intermediate outcomes
and worst outcomes, whereas the best outcomes showed the lar-
gest BOLD responses. Their ﬁndings suggested that these brain
areas classify the outcomes into two categories: the best outcomes
are classiﬁed as good and all other outcomes are classiﬁed as bad.
The similarity between our results and Nieuwenhuis et al.’s ﬁnd-
ings support the validity of our study. More importantly, our
ﬁndings suggest that the brain activations in bilateral vStr and PCC
reﬂect dishonest actions only when the participants perceived that
they had escaped from detection and punishment. Our ﬁnding has
the potential to be utilized in real life to detect dishonest beha-
viors, especially when traditional methods (such as behavioral
performance test) seem to fail. This in turn evokes conﬁdence in
the dishonest person regarding his/her success. However, caution
should be taken when applying the ﬁndings of this study to reality.
Participants in this study gained material rewards, whereas more
complex rewards, including monetary gain, the joy of escaping
from punishment, and the sense of achievement in fooling an in-
tellectual agent, serve as the incentives for dishonest people in real
life. These different processes are interesting but could not be
discriminated in this study and should be investigated in future
research.
It is interesting that the mOFC showed different activation
patterns compared with the vStr and PCC. The differences between
dishonest and honest outcomes were found only when the real
situation was detected by the human but not computer counter-
part. McCabe et al. (2001) in an earlier study found that co-
operators in a Trust Game exhibited stronger activation in mOFC
when playing a human rather than computer counterpart,
whereas there was no signiﬁcant difference in non-cooperators.
The mOFC may attribute extra rewards to the cooperative (vs. non-
cooperative) behaviors when playing human counterparts. It is
possible that, when being detected during the ﬁnal presentation,
compared with playing a computer honestly, playing a human
honestly was regarded as more rewarding and thus elicited
stronger activations in mOFC. That explains why we found a sig-
niﬁcant negative-going activation pattern when dishonest choices
were made compared to honest choices when the counterpart was
a human being. More importantly, the activations in mOFC may
reﬂect the different response strategies to human and to computer
counterparts, respectively, and may thus be utilized to differ-
entiate dishonesty (i.e., riskyþantisocial decision) from simply
taking risk (i.e., risky decision). Methodologies may be used to
Fig. 3. fMRI ﬁndings. The outcomes of dishonest (vs. honest) choices elicited stronger BOLD activations in bilateral mOFC (medial orbitofrontal cortex), PCC (posterior
cingulate cortex), and vStr in the N condition (not being detected) than in the Y condition (being detected). This effect was similar between PC (computer) and Hm (human)
counterparts. The SPM T map is voxel-level thresholded po0.001 with cluster size 4100 voxels for observation purpose only. The y-axis indicated the % signal change of the
contrast Dis–Hon. L—left; npo0.05, nnpo0.01, and nnnpo0.001. Error bar denotes sem.
Table 3
One sample t-tests (two-tailed) of the neural responses (% signal changes for fMRI
data and mean amplitudes for ERP data) for the contrast of outcomes between
dishonest and honest choices in different ROIs/ERP components under different
conditions.
fMRI (n¼20)
R vStr L vStr PCC mOFC
t p t p t p t p
PC&Y 0.138 3.568 0.687 2.001 0.641 2.117 1.902 0.290
PC&N 8.119 0.000 5.922 0.000 4.254 0.002 0.489 2.522
Hm&Y 0.428 2.694 0.825 1.678 0.836 1.654 3.252 0.017
Hm&N 5.301 0.000 4.356 0.001 2.972 0.031 2.304 0.131
ERP (n¼18)
FRN P3a P3b
t p t p t p
PC&Y 1.339 0.793 4.084 0.003 4.610 0.001
PC&N 4.361 0.002 1.689 0.438 2.757 0.054
Hm&Y 1.505 0.603 3.247 0.019 2.428 0.106
Hm&N 3.322 0.016 0.695 1.985 3.843 0.005
Note: Upper panel, one sample T tests (two-tailed) on the % signal changes of the
contrast Dis–Hon in areas of interest (i.e. L/R vStr, PCC and mOFC) were conducted
under each of the four conditions. Lower panel, one sample T tests (two tailed) on
the mean amplitudes of the contrast Dis–Hon in ERP components of interest (i.e.
FRN, P3a and P3b) were conducted under each of the four conditions. All p values
were adjusted by Bonferroni correction. Hm—human counterpart, PC—computer
counterpart, Y—being detected, and N—not being detected.
Table 2
ERP results of the 2 (Counterpart, Hm vs. PC) by 2 (Detection, Y vs. N) ANOVA
analysis on the contrast of outcomes between dishonest and honest choices.
FRN P3a P3b
Mean amplitudes (μV)
mean sem mean sem mean sem
PC&Y 0.815 0.609 3.204 0.785 3.472 0.753
PC&N 2.960 0.679 1.133 0.671 1.452 0.527
Hm&Y 0.702 0.467 1.996 0.615 2.066 0.851
Hm&N 1.481 0.446 0.265 0.381 1.417 0.369
Statistical values
F p F p F p
Counterpart 5.245 0.035 5.807 0.028 3.385 0.083
Detection 7.378 0.015 10.732 0.004 4.258 0.055
CounterpartDetection 2.649 0.122 0.211 0.652 4.727 0.044
Note: Sample size¼18; sem—standard error of the mean.
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in future studies. For example, oxytocin has been found to be able
to raise the level of trust, but not risk-taking behaviors (Kosfeld
et al., 2005).
We found that Dis (vs. Hon) choices were related with stronger
BOLD activations in bilateral inferior frontal gyrus/insula and
medial frontal gyrus, including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).
A plenty of previous studies showed joint fMRI activations of theseregions in subjects experiencing emotional feelings of a large
variety of emotions, including fear, anger, sadness and happiness
(Craig, 2009). They were then supposed to serve as a salience
Fig. 4. ERP ﬁndings. The outcomes of dishonest (vs. honest) choices elicited smaller FRN (250–280 ms, most prominent at Fz), P3a (370–420 ms, most prominent at Fz), and
P3b (450–490 ms, most prominent at Pz; only for the PC [computer] but not Hm [human] counterpart) in the N condition (not being detected) than in the Y condition (being
detected). Scalp topographies and waveforms of (dishonest–honest) choices are shown. The y-axis indicated the amplitudes (μV) of the contrast Dis–Hon. $po0.06, npo0.05,
and nnpo0.01. Error bar denotes sem.
D. Sun et al. / Neuropsychologia 68 (2015) 148–157 155system which responds to the degree of subjective salience (Me-
non and Uddin, 2010). Considering that the Dis (vs. Hon) choices
were related with larger positive (gain because of not detected) or
negative (loss because of being caught) feelings, the fMRI activa-
tions in bilateral inferior frontal gyrus/insula and ACC might reﬂect
the intensity of feelings to the outcome.Fig. 5. (A) Average effect of condition for the contrast Dis–Hon in fMRI data. IFG/INS—i
gyrus, STG—superior temporal gyrus, and Supr—supramarginal gyrus. (B) ERP waveforms
solid (dashed) lines represent human (computer) counterpart, and purple (green) lines4.2. Time course of processing the outcomes of dishonest choices
Consistent with our second a priori hypothesis, we found that
there is smaller FRN (more positive-going amplitudes) when dis-
honest (relative to honest) choices were made but were not de-
tected compared to detected. The FRN was found to be able tonferior frontal gyrus/insula, Med FG—medial frontal gyrus, Mid FG—middle frontal
of all conditions in channel Fz and Pz. Thick (thin) lines represent Hon (Dis) choices,
represent being (not) detected.
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outcomes, with larger FRN corresponding to the other outputs
than the best feedback (Holroyd, et al., 2004). In line with this
thought, our result suggests that the successful dishonest action
was recognized as the best output compared with the con-
sequences of the other conditions in the very early neural pro-
cessing of feedback information.
Further analyses showed that the difference between the dis-
honest outcome and honest outcome was found only when not
being detected and suggested that the FRN responds to the out-
come of successful (but not failed) dishonest choice. Holroyd et al.
(2004) found that both the medium and the worst outcomes eli-
cited larger FRN than the best outcomes, whereas there was no
difference between the medium and the worst outcomes. The si-
milar FRN patterns between Holroyd et al.’s and our ﬁndings
support the validity of this study and suggest using this early ERP
component to uncover the dishonest persons when they know
that they have escaped detection.
This FRN response pattern is similar to that of the BOLD acti-
vations in bilateral vStr and PCC. The convergent ﬁndings from
both fMRI and ERP datasets again support the validity of our task
design. Furthermore, they also suggested that the vStr and PCC are
the sources generating the FRN. Consistent with this idea, some
previous studies using source reconstruction analysis also showed
that the vStr (Foti et al., 2011; Martin et al., 2009) and PCC (Do-
namayor et al., 2011; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005c) are the possible
origins of FRN.
Surprisingly, larger P3a was elicited by a failed dishonest action
(no reward) relative to an honest choice (medium reward), while
there was no difference of P3a when comparing successful dis-
honest action (large reward) with honest choice. P3a is often
aroused by novel and highly deviant or salient task-irrelevant
stimuli (for a review, see Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005a) and is sug-
gested to reﬂect the early attention allocation to stimuli (for a
review, see Polich and Criado (2006)). Therefore, our results may
reﬂect that enhanced attention was invested into a failed dis-
honest action (relative to honest choice), whereas a comparable
amount of attention given to a successful dishonest behavior and
an honest choice. Interestingly, the P3a response pattern was a
mirrored reverse to the FRN response pattern. It is possible that
the dishonest persons ﬁrstly processed the feedback of successful
action (reﬂected by enhanced FRN) and then processed the out-
come of failed action (reﬂected by increased P3a). However, we did
not ﬁnd the similar activation pattern in fMRI data. Previous stu-
dies did not get a convergent conclusion about the neural sources
of P3. One opinion is that P3-like neural responses were generated
by multiple, relatively independent sources while the other opi-
nion is that the P3 activity reﬂects the inﬂuence of a broadly dis-
tributed neural system that synchronously impacts several brain
areas (for a review, see Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005a). Future studies
should clarify what neural source(s) generated the P3a for out-
comes of failed dishonest actions.
Contrary to our third a priori hypothesis, we found smaller P3b
(more positive-going amplitudes) when dishonest (relative to
honest) choices were made but not detected than detected dis-
honest choices when the counterpart was a computer (but not
human). This result was different from the Yeung and Sanfey’s
ﬁnding (2004) that larger P3b was elicited by larger reward
magnitude, suggesting that the P3b amplitudes in our study did
not simply reﬂect the magnitude of rewards. The P3b was found to
be larger for unexpected than expected events, regardless of the
valence (for a review, see Martin, 2012). Participants made dis-
honest choices in this task to gain a larger reward. The outcome of
a failed dishonest choice was contrary to their predictions and
may thus elicit larger P3b. Moreover, we found that dishonest (vs.
honest) outcomes were associated with larger P3b in almost allconditions (except for the condition of the human counterpart and
being detected). The P3b amplitudes were modulated by the
amount of attention paid to the stimulus (Nieuwenhuis et al.,
2005a). Compared to the outcome of an honest action (a default
choice in social interaction), participants in this study might have
attributed larger attention to the dishonest choice, which is risky
and often violates social norms. More importantly, we found that
failed dishonest action elicited larger P3b with the computer but
not human counterpart. This is the only difference between
counterpart types we found in ERP data. Considering that the only
difference between counterpart types in fMRI results was found in
mOFC, we speculate that a similar neural processing is reﬂected by
both datasets. That is to say, when being detected, compared with
the output of a safe action (i.e., playing computer honestly), the
outcome of an honest choice (i.e., playing human honestly) was
attributed with an extra reward, which was represented by
stronger activations in mOFC and larger P3b amplitudes for an
honest outcome. Therefore, when comparing the dishonest out-
come with the honest outcome, relatively negative activations in
mOFC were detected, whereas no signiﬁcant P3b difference was
found. This speculation is interesting but requires further study to
validate it.
4.3. Limitation and future studies
There are a few shortcomings in this study. First, we only stu-
died females of a narrow age range in order to control for the sex-
and age-related cognitive effects on the experimental task. How-
ever, the trade-off is the limitation of the generalization of our
ﬁndings to other populations, e.g. to females older than the par-
ticipants in this study and to a male population. Previous studies
have shown signiﬁcant sex-related effects on risky decision mak-
ing. For example, Dreber and Johannesson (2008) have shown that
males are more likely than females to lie to gain monetary bene-
ﬁts. A recent fMRI study found that, when instructed to tell lies
about personal information, males elicited stronger activations in
the left middle frontal gyrus than did females (Marchewka et al.,
2012). Also, difference in gender was found to have inﬂuenced
emotion processing; for example, in a task requiring cognitive
control of emotions, females showed increased activations in more
emotion-associated areas (e.g., the amygdala and the orbitofrontal
cortex), while males showed stronger activations in more cogni-
tion-associated regions (e.g., prefrontal and superior parietal
areas) (Koch et al., 2007). In line with these ﬁndings, males and
females may respond differently while being dishonest as well as
when encountering the consequences of their choices. Future
studies should directly compare the neural correlates between
males and females to fully understand the neural processing of
dishonesty. Second, the small sample size could have been low-
ered the power of the analyses and henceforth may increase the
risk for false negative results. Future studies should consider
conducting a priori sample size estimation and having better
control on the attrition of the subjects throughout the experiment.
Also, a large sample size would add stability of the ﬁndings and
increase the power of the analyses. Third, a laboratory experi-
mental task paradigm was recruited in this study to control the
variables of interest or no interest. However, participants in this
environment may behave differently compared to dishonest per-
sons in real life. Further studies should test whether the ﬁndings
in the laboratory could be generalized to real life contexts. Last but
not the least, participants in this study were all healthy volunteers
whereas some of the dishonest persons in real life are driven by
psychological and/or neurological deﬁcits (Dike et al., 2005; Poletti
et al., 2011). It is also interesting to investigate the neural pro-
cessing of dishonest behaviors in people with mental disorders.
D. Sun et al. / Neuropsychologia 68 (2015) 148–157 1575. Conclusion
We investigated the neural correlates of processing the out-
comes of dishonest decisions. Both fMRI and ERP methodologies
were recruited to record neural responses in participants when
they were playing an economic exchanging game task. We found
that the outcomes of successful dishonest (vs. honest) choices
elicited both stronger BOLD activations in vStr and PCC and
smaller FRN. These results suggest that successful dishonest
choices elicited more positive outcome evaluation and attention
processing. Moreover, the outcomes of failed dishonest (relative to
honest) choices were associated with different BOLD activations in
mOFC and different P3b amplitudes between human and com-
puter counterparts. These ﬁndings suggest that processing the
output of social decision making (playing human) requires differ-
ent neural mechanisms than that of risk taking (playing compu-
ter). The ﬁndings advanced our understanding about the neural
processing of outcome presentation post a dishonest choice.Acknowledgments
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